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INTRODUCTION 
On December 20, 2014, Officers Rafael Ramos and Wenjian Liu of 
the New York City Police Department were sitting in a parked patrol car 
in Brooklyn, New York when a man armed with a handgun approached 
from the passenger side and fired multiple rounds into the vehicle, 
instantly killing both officers.1 At a press conference that evening, the New 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by SAVANNAH WALKER. 
 1. Melanie Eversley, Katharine Lackey & Trevor Hughes, Two NYPD 
Officers Killed in Ambush Style Shooting, USA TODAY (Dec. 21, 2014, 9:21 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/20/new-york-city-police-
officers-shot/20698679/ [https://perma.cc/NN3C-QGF7]. 
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York City Police Commissioner announced that the shooter deliberately 
targeted the police officers “for their uniform and the responsibility they 
embraced.”2 The Commissioner pointed to posts on the shooter’s social 
media accounts foreshadowing a plan to “put wings on pigs” in retaliation 
for the highly protested police killings of Eric Garner and Michael Brown3 
as evidence of the killer’s bias against police officers.4  
The outrage surrounding the assassination of Officers Ramos and Liu 
was widespread.5 Politicians and protesters alike condemned the 
violence.6 Many people, however, believed the shooting was not a 
senseless, isolated act but evidence of something bigger: law enforcement 
was under systematic attack, a phenomenon politicians hastily dubbed a 
“war on cops.”7 
In the spring of 2016, Louisiana State Representative Lance Harris 
drafted House Bill 953,8 a solution to what he perceived as an intentional 
crusade to terrorize police officers evidenced by the murders of Ramos 
                                                                                                             
 2. Id. 
 3. Ismaiiyl Brinsley (@dontrunup), INSTAGRAM (Dec. 20, 2014), archived at 
http://gawker.com/cop-killers-instagram-im-putting-wings-on-pigs-today-1673793 
374 (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZP2C-M8HE]; Ferguson Unrest: 
from Shooting to Nationwide Protests, BBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc 
.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354 [https://perma.cc/4FE5-YA3G]; Al Baker, 
Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-
island.html [https://perma.cc/2DXZ-9YR8]. 
 4. Eversley et al., supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., Steve Benen, Ted Cruz Shows How Not to Respond to Police 
Killings, MSNBC (Sept. 2, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-
maddow-show/ted-cruz-shows-how-not-respond-police-killings (quoting Senator 
Ted Cruz, who remarked that cops are “feeling the assault” nationwide) 
[https://perma.cc/PW2T-JKW7]; Radley Balko, Scott Walker Couldn’t Be More 
Wrong About the Threat to Police Officers , WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/09/03/scott-walker- 
couldnt-be-more-wrong-about-the-threat-to-police-officers/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.5 
84f49b74c56 (criticizing Wisconsin governor Scott Walker’s comments on what he 
perceives as “a disturbing trend of police officers being murdered on the job”) 
[https://perma.cc/77HD-YFQN]. 
 8. H.B. 953, Reg. Sess. (La. 2016). 
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and Liu9 and a similar murder of a deputy in Cypress, Texas.10 The bill was 
termed the “Blue Lives Matter” bill, its name being a response to Black 
Lives Matter, a civil rights group11 that has been accused of inciting anti-
police violence through its protests of police activity.12 The bill sought to 
modify Louisiana’s hate crime statute, which provides increased penalties 
for offenders who select their victims based on the individual victim’s race, 
age, gender, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national 
origin, ancestry, or organizational affiliation.13 The modification added 
“actual or perceived employment as a law enforcement officer, firefighter, 
or emergency medical services personnel” to the list of protected 
characteristics.14  
The bill passed the House unanimously and passed the Senate by a 
margin of 33-3.15 Governor John Bel Edwards signed it into law on May 
26, 2016, officially making Louisiana the first state to offer additional 
protection to law enforcement officers through hate crime legislation.16 
                                                                                                             
 9. Elizabeth Crisp, ‘Blue Lives Matter’: Louisiana Legislature Considers 
Hate Crime Protections for Police, Firefighters, ADVOCATE (Apr. 26, 2016, 3:26 
PM), http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/Legislature/article 
_f82c5a03-f31a-5574-bc5b-f1311aa1348f.html (explaining that Representative 
Harris cited the murders of Ramos and Liu in his proposal) [https://perma.cc 
/MK86-DPLR]. 
 10. See Elizabeth Chuck & James Novogrod, Texas Deputy Darren Goforth, 
Slain at Cypress Gas Station, Remembered at Funeral, NBC NEWS (Sept. 4, 2015, 
3:19 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/thousands-attend-funeral-
texas-deputy-darren-goforth-n421831 [https://perma.cc/4JKG-TC9B]. 
 11. “Black Lives Matter” began as a protest cry after the 2012 fatal shooting 
of unarmed African-American teenager Trayvon Martin but now refers to a 
national political group that includes 30 official chapters. See Alex Altman, 
Person of the Year, the Short List: No. 4, Black Lives Matter, TIME (Dec. 2015), 
http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2015-runner-up-black-lives-matter/ 
[https://perma.cc/WBX9-USV6]. The group protests various forms of perceived 
racial oppression and injustice, but its largest and most visible protests have been 
those aimed at police brutality following the high-profile deaths of several 
African-American men at the hands of law enforcement. See id. 
 12. Richard Perez-Pena, Louisiana Enacts Hate Crime Laws to Protect a New 
Group: Police, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27 
/us/louisiana-enacts-hate-crimes-law-to-protect-a-new-group-police.html?_r=0  
[https://perma.cc/3T44-MYL6]. 
 13. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:107.2 (2018). 
 14. Act No. 953, 2016 La. Acts 2038. 
 15. Perez-Pena, supra note 12. 
 16. Id. 
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Legislators across the country subsequently have proposed similar bills at 
both state17 and federal18 levels. 
Upon signing the bill, Governor Edwards declared that law 
enforcement officers deserve every available protection,19 but he chose the 
wrong avenue for effectuating this protection. The hate crime statute is an 
improper safeguard against anti-police crimes for two main reasons. First, 
status as a police officer is not the kind of identity characteristic that 
belongs in a hate crime statute.20 Second, the Blue Lives Matter 
amendment will not effectively protect police officers from the kinds of 
violent attacks that inspired its existence because the law’s structure makes 
it an impractical tool to prosecute such offenses.21 Instead, the 
modification will weaken Louisiana’s hate crime statute by opening it up 
to massive over-expansion and may ultimately exacerbate the ongoing 
social conflict between citizens and police officers.22 To avoid these 
consequences and serve the legitimate purpose of police protection, the 
Blue Lives Matter law should be repealed or, at the very least, rewritten. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the purpose of hate crime laws 
through historical context, explaining the various forms the laws take at 
the state level. Part II introduces Louisiana’s hate crime statute, analyzes 
the inconsistencies in the Blue Lives Matter amendment, and predicts the 
consequences the amendment will have on hate crime law, citizens, and 
social unity. Part III proposes the repeal of the amendment and considers 
heavy modification of the statute as an alternative solution. Finally, this 
Comment implores the Louisiana Legislature (“Legislature”) to use either 
of these solutions, both of which will protect police officers while avoiding 
the array of problems created by the Blue Lives Matter amendment. 
                                                                                                             
 17. See, e.g., Jonathan Silver, Abbott: Targeted Killing of Police Should Be a 
Hate Crime, TEX. TRIBUNE (July 18, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016 
/07/18/abbott-wants-killing-police-officer-become-hate-cr/ (explaining Texas’s 
Police Protection Act, which would extend hate crime protections to law 
enforcement officers) [https://perma.cc/DL9H-LRVZ].  
 18. Attacks on Police Are Hateful, but Are They Hate Crimes?, L.A. TIMES 
(Aug. 16, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-
police-hate-20160816-snap-story.html (explaining Representative Ken Buck’s 
“Blue Lives Matter Act,” a bill similar to Louisiana’s that expands the federal hate 
crime statute to cover police officers) [https://perma.cc/9QXY-27NV].  
 19. Gov. Edwards Signs HB 953, Five Veterans’ Bills, OFFICE OF THE 
GOVERNOR (May 26, 2016), http://gov.louisiana.gov/news/gov-edwards-signs-
hb-953-five-veterans-bills [https://perma.cc/JXP4-FN5B]. 
 20. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 21. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 22. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
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I. HATE CRIME LAWS: A BROAD OVERVIEW 
Criminal acts inspired by prejudice are harmful to a multiethnic, 
multiracial, and multireligious society.23 Since the late 1960s,24 legislators 
have addressed this narrow class of offenses through hate crime laws, 
which serve a unique and crucial purpose in the legal system.25 By 
specifically targeting bias-inspired offenses, the laws seek to condemn 
prejudice and protect citizens from the crimes that violate the principles of 
equality and anti-discrimination that are central to American culture.26 
A. Defining “Hate Crime” 
 The term “hate crime” became a topic of national conversation in the 
1980s following the introduction of the Hate Crime Statistics Act 
(“HCSA”),27 which required the Department of Justice to collect and 
publish statistics on crimes motivated by racial, religious, or ethnic 
prejudice.28 Since that time, the federal government and 48 states have 
adopted different variations of hate crime statutes.29 The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (“FBI”) defines hate crimes as “traditional offense[s], like 
murder, arson, or vandalism with an added element of bias.”30 A hate 
crime has two components: (1) the offender must commit a crime; and (2) 
the offender must be motivated to commit the crime because of his hatred 
                                                                                                             
 23. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 24. The most direct precursor to modern hate crime statutes is United States 
Code § 245, enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Avlana Eisenberg, 
Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 865 (2014). The law allows federal 
prosecution of anyone who interferes with victims’ participation in certain federally 
protected activities—such as attending school and voting—because of the victim’s 
race, color, religion, or national origin. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (2018).  
 25. FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER 
AMERICAN LAW 1 (2002). 
 26. Id. at 42. 
 27. JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND 
IDENTITY POLITICS 4 (2000). The HCSA became law in 1990. See 28 U.S.C. § 534. 
 28. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 4. 
 29. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 867. 
 30. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WHAT WE INVESTIGATE: CIVIL 
RIGHTS, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/hate-crimes (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/F98Z-2HY2]. Because of the bias requirement, 
hate crimes are commonly called “bias crimes.” See, e.g., LAWRENCE, supra note 
25, at 9 (explaining that he uses the term “bias crime” rather than “hate crime” to 
emphasize that the key factor in a bias crime is not the perpetrator’s hatred of the 
victim but his prejudice or bias toward that victim). 
1418 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
of the victim.31 To meet the second requirement, the hatred motivating the 
offender must be connected to the offender’s general antipathy for a 
protected group or for the victim specifically because of membership in 
that group.32 In short, the perpetrator must commit the crime not because 
of who the victim is as an individual but because the victim represents the 
group that the perpetrator hates.33 
B. Why We Legislate Hate 
Although hate crime laws vary in the characteristics they protect and 
the penalties they impose, the core practical purpose of hate crime 
legislation is to combat and condemn violence against people based on 
fundamental features of their identity.34 The deterrence efficacy of the 
laws is unclear.35 There is little evidence to prove definitively that enacting 
hate crime statutes reduces the occurrence of hate crimes.36 The laws’ 
debatable deterrent effects, however, do not detract from their expressive 
value.37 Hate crime laws send messages.38 To victims, the laws convey 
messages of support and solidarity,39 and to society, they serve as an 
official condemnation of bigotry.40 The laws are symbolic political acts 
that evoke strong emotions in the public and shape their expectations by 
                                                                                                             
 31. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 9. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 867 (quoting then-President Obama’s 
description of a federal hate crime law as an important step that would “help 
protect our citizens from violence based on what they look like, who they love, 
[or] how they pray”). 
 35. Susan B. Gellman & Frederick M. Lawrence, Agreeing to Agree: A 
Proponent and Opponent of Hate Crime Laws Reach For Common Ground, 41 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 421, 428 (2004); see also Alex Ginsburg, Hate is Enough: 
How New York’s Bias Crimes Statute Has Exceeded Its Intended Scope, 76 
BROOK. L. REV. 1599, 1607 (2011) (explaining that detractors argue that hate 
crime statutes do nothing to actually deter hate crimes). 
 36. Gellman & Lawrence, supra note 35, at 429 (describing studies that failed 
to find that enacting hate crime statutes had any effect on hate crime rates). 
 37. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 858. 
 38. Laura Meli, Hate Crime and Punishment: Why Typical Punishment Does 
Not Fit The Crime, U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 921, 948 (2014). 
 39. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 67. 
 40. Id. at 68. 
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establishing a societal norm against crimes rooted in identity-based 
prejudice.41  
Generally, state legislatures seek to accomplish the practical and 
expressive purposes of hate crime laws by punishing more severely those 
offenders motivated by prejudice.42 Hate crimes are especially detrimental 
to victims because they often cause greater physical43 and psychological44 
harm than parallel crimes with motives other than bias.45 Hate crimes also 
damage society because they are likely to provoke retaliatory crimes and 
create turmoil in the community.46 By imposing harsher penalties on those 
persons who commit hate crimes, legislators acknowledge the unique 
harms that the crimes cause and reaffirm the seriousness of the offenses.47 
C. Structure of State Hate Crime Statutes 
State hate crime statutes can be divided into two separate but 
overlapping analytical models: the discriminatory selection model48 and 
the animus model.49 Under a discriminatory selection statute, any offense 
in which the offender chooses the victim for a discriminatory reason 
                                                                                                             
 41. Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive 
Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1259 (2000). 
 42. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1608 (explaining that the majority of state 
hate crime statutes are sentence enhancement statutes that increase the penalty for 
certain crimes when the offender’s motive involves a certain prejudice); see also 
JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 29. 
 43. Meli, supra note 38, at 951 (explaining that in comparison to assault with 
other motives, hate crime assaults are twice as likely to cause serious injury to the 
victim and four times as likely to necessitate hospitalization). 
 44. Id.; see also LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 40 (explaining that hate crime 
victims often feel helpless because they cannot reasonably minimize the risk of future 
attacks without changing the central identity characteristic that made them victims). 
 45. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 4142.  
 46. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488 (1993). 
 47. Meli, supra note 38, at 948. 
 48. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 30.  
 49. Lawrence refers specifically to “racial” animus and “racial or ethnic 
group” of the victim, but the classification of “racial animus” statutes is 
understood by some scholars to refer to animus on the basis of any characteristic 
covered by a hate crime statute, not only race. For that purpose, it sometimes is 
referred to as the “animus” model. See, e.g., Raegan Jorn, Mean Streets: Violence 
Against the Homeless and the Makings of a Hate Crime, 6 HASTINGS RACE & 
POVERTY L.J. 305, 314 (2009); see also Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1608 
(referring to Lawrence’s racial animus model as the “group animus” model). 
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constitutes a hate crime.50 Animus statutes have a motive component, 
requiring that the offender be motivated by animus toward the victim’s 
identity group.51 The distinction is best illustrated through an example. 
Offender A exclusively robs Asian people because he believes that they 
generally carry more valuables than people of other ethnicities.52 Offender 
B exclusively robs Asian people because he dislikes them as a group and 
hopes to intimidate them into leaving his neighborhood.53 Offender A has 
committed a hate crime under a discriminatory selection statute because 
he selected the victim on the basis of race—but not under a racial animus 
statute because he lacks bias motivation.54 Offender B meets the specific 
subset of bias crimes covered by animus statutes.55 Discriminatory 
selection statutes are broad enough to cover opportunistic crimes with bias 
elements while animus statutes focus on crimes of pure hate.56 
Legislative history suggests that regardless of the statutory model 
chosen, legislators enact hate crime laws to combat attacks motivated by 
prejudice.57 Animus statutes, which explicitly require proof of such 
motives, more precisely target the crimes the statutes seek to address.58 
Still, the majority of states, including Louisiana,59 continue to use the 
                                                                                                             
 50. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1608. Under a typical discriminatory selection 
statute, an offender commits a hate crime if he or she “intentionally selects the person 
against whom [the crime] is committed because of his race, religious conviction, color 
or national origin.” See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (2018). 
 51. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1608. A typical animus statute requires proof 
of “prejudice,” “bigotry and bias,” or “hostility” based on the victim’s identity. 
See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 870; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (2018) 
(enhancing penalties when the crime “evidences prejudice based on” designated 
characteristics); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(I)(f) (2018) (extending sentence 
of an offender who “[w]as substantially motivated to commit the crime because 
of hostility towards the victim’s religion, race, creed, sexual orientation”). 
 52. See LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 30. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1608. 
 57. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 870. 
 58. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 79 (arguing that an animus model statute 
more appropriately defines a bias crime); see also JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 
27, at 146 (arguing that hate crime statutes should use the narrowest possible 
definition by requiring group based animus to prevent mere “fights involving 
epithets” from being classified as hate crimes). 
 59. See LA. REV. STAT. § 14:107.2 (2018) (making it unlawful for any person 
to select the victim of certain enumerated offenses “because of actual or 
perceived” protected characteristics); see also LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 35–
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discriminatory selection model,60 generating concern that the broadly 
applicable laws may grant prosecutors the power to punish a much wider 
array of offenses than intended.61 Concerns of overreach have been 
exacerbated by the trend of hate crime law expansion62 that has recently 
reached Louisiana’s statute through the Blue Lives Matter amendment.  
II. DISSECTING THE FLAWS OF THE BLUE LIVES MATTER LAW 
Since its enactment in 1997, Louisiana’s statute has included a vast 
list of protected characteristics, including “actual or perceived race, age, 
gender, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national 
origin, or ancestry” and “actual or perceived membership or service in, or 
employment with, an organization.”63 In 2016, the Blue Lives Matter 
amendment further expanded the law by adding “actual or perceived 
employment as a law enforcement officer, firefighter, or emergency 
medical services personnel” to the list of protected characteristics.64  
Representative Harris proposed the bill as an additional means of 
protecting police officers.65 Governor Edwards concurred, describing the 
bill as a well-deserved protection for police officers that sent a clear 
message of Louisiana’s refusal to tolerate hate crimes.66 Representative 
Harris and Governor Edwards’s comments suggest that the purpose of the 
law is twofold: to send a message about the seriousness of crimes against 
police and provide extra legislative protection for police officers. 
                                                                                                             
36 (explaining that most states use statutes with “because of” language consistent 
with a discriminatory selection model). 
 60. Jorn, supra note 49, at 312 (explaining that many states adopted 
discriminatory selection statutes modeled after Wisconsin’s statute upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)). 
 61. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1602.  
 62. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 63. § 14:107.2. When the underlying offense is a misdemeanor, the offender 
may be required to pay a fine of up to $500, be imprisoned for up to six months, 
or both. § 14:107.2(B). When the underlying offense is a felony, the offender may 
be fined up to $5,000, be imprisoned for up to five years, or both. § 14:107.2(C). 
These sentences run consecutively with the sentences for the underlying offenses. 
§ 14:107.2(C). 
 64. H.B. 953, Reg. Sess. (La. 2016). 
 65. Perez-Pena, supra note 12 (quoting Representative Harris, who explained that 
“[he] just wanted to give an extra level of protection to the people who protect us”). 
 66. See OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 19 (quoting Governor Edwards, 
who stated that “[police officers] deserve every protection that we can give them”). 
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Unfortunately, the law is ill-equipped to serve either purpose effectively.67 
Its language makes it difficult to use as a means of protection, and the 
practical enforcement of the law is likely to contradict any message that it 
sends.68 Furthermore, the law could actually jeopardize the effectiveness 
of the hate crime statute as a whole.69 
A. The Unnecessary Expressive Purpose 
Generally, hate crime laws do not fill any practical void in the criminal 
law because they recriminalize already criminal behavior.70 The purpose 
of the laws is instead largely expressive.71 The laws warn potential 
offenders that crimes rooted in bias are particularly reprehensible and will 
be punished severely.72 For traditional hate crime statutes, this message 
signified a shift in policy, demonstrating the government’s commitment to 
treating crimes that had long been downplayed or ignored as serious 
offenses.73 In contrast, the Blue Lives Matter law sends a message about 
crimes against police that is wholly unnecessary. 74 
There is no evidence suggesting that crimes against police are, like 
other hate crimes, underreported or insufficiently investigated.75 On the 
contrary, the crimes are documented meticulously76 and prosecuted 
                                                                                                             
 67. See Collier Meyerson, The Case Against ‘Blue Lives Matter’ Bills, THE 
NATION (May 23, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/case-blue-lives-matter-
bills/ (explaining the difficulty of prosecuting crimes against police under a hate 
crime statute) [https://perma.cc/HG4S-VFJU].  
 68. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 858. 
 69. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 70. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 5 (arguing that hate crime statutes 
did not come about because of a lacuna in criminal law; rather, crime statutes 
came about because of the rising significance of identity politics). 
 71. Beale, supra note 41, at 1255. 
 72. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 68. 
 73. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 865 (explaining how United States 
Code § 245, a precursor to modern hate crime statutes, sought to address the 
racially motivated violence that state governments had largely ignored). 
 74. See Attacks Against Police Are Not Hate Crimes, ANTI-DEFAMATION 
LEAGUE (June 7, 2016), https://www.adl.org/blog/attacks-against-police-are-not-
hate-crimes [https://perma.cc/U6QF-MFZM].  
 75.  Id.  
 76. The Federal Bureau of Investigation specifically tracks crimes against 
police and prepares an annual report on the findings. See, e.g., FBI Releases 2015 
Preliminary Statistics for Law Enforcement Officers Killed in the Line of Duty, 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (May 16, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news 
/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2015-preliminary-statistics-for-law-enforce  
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vigorously77 through criminal statutes that carry significant penalties. For 
example, an offender who commits simple battery on a civilian faces a 
maximum sentence of six months,78 but an offender who commits the same 
offense on a police officer will serve a minimum sentence of one year.79 
Though an offender who commits aggravated assault on a civilian faces a 
maximum sentence of only six months,80 the same offense committed on 
a police officer carries a maximum sentence of ten years.81 Hate crime 
laws use heightened penalties to demonstrate the gravity of the offense, 
but Louisiana legislators sufficiently conveyed the seriousness of crimes 
against police officers well before the existence of the Blue Lives Matter 
law.82 The law does not send a new message but simply restates a message 
that has long been apparent.83 
Admittedly, however, pre-existing criminal statutes that adequately 
address offenses against a particular group do not always justify 
withholding hate crime coverage from that group. Before gender was 
widely included as a protected characteristic in hate crime statutes, 
opponents of the inclusion argued that the addition was unnecessary 
because violence against women was already well covered by existing 
criminal law provisions.84 Proponents argued in response that by 
excluding gender, legislators were implying to victims of gender violence 
that they did not deserve the same level of protection as victims of ethnic, 
racial, or religious prejudice crimes.85 Essentially, the proponents 
implored legislators to consider not only the communicative impact of 
adding a characteristic to the statute but also the impact of its exclusion.86  
                                                                                                             
ment-officers-killed-in-the-line-of-duty [https://perma.cc/EWX7-G9QP].  
 77. Making Attacks Against Police Hate Crimes Goes Too Far, DENV. POST 
(July 20, 2016, 5:18 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/07/20/making-attacks-
against-police-hate-crimes-goes-too-far/ (noting that the justice system “comes 
down extra hard” when a police officer is harmed) [https://perma.cc/K9Z4-PM3D]. 
 78. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:35(B) (2018). 
 79. Id. § 14:34.2(B). 
 80. Id. § 14:37. 
 81. Id. § 14:37.2. 
 82. Perez-Pena, supra note 12. 
 83. Id. 
 84. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 15 (explaining the argument that the 
legislature had already addressed violence against women through its laws on 
domestic violence and sexual assault). 
 85. Id. at 17. 
 86. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 133 (explaining that during the 
debate over adding sexual orientation to bias crime statutes, the director of the 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force argued that if sexual orientation was not 
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The eventual success of those advocating expansion suggests that a 
redundant law is preferable to exclusion when exclusion would devalue 
victims. Excluding police officers, however, will not have a significant 
negative effect.87 Louisiana legislators clearly demonstrated that police 
officers are worthy of protection by imposing significantly harsher 
penalties upon those who harm them.88 Further, states heavily arm police 
and give them full authority to protect themselves.89 Leaving 
“employment as a police officer” out of the hate crime statute does not 
negate the message conveyed by existing protections, and including it does 
not send any new message that would necessitate the addition.90 
B. The Practical Shortcomings 
Even expressive laws should do more than symbolize political 
recognition of an issue to constitute a proper exercise of the legislative 
function.91 Legislators should also consider the law’s practical and 
measurable goals.92 If the goal of the Blue Lives Matter law is to protect 
police officers from attacks, the hate crime statute is not the proper 
means.93 “Employment as a police officer” is not the kind of identity trait 
contemplated by hate crime legislation, and including it threatens the 
legitimacy of the law by inviting constitutional challenges and 
overexpansion.94 Furthermore, the statute is unlikely to be an effective 
                                                                                                             
included, the law would be sending “a dangerous signal that this kind of crime is 
less reprehensible”). 
 87. See DENV. POST, supra note 77; see also Arjun Singh Sethi, Louisiana Draws 
Blue Line in Wrong Places, CNN (July 6, 2016, 5:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com 
/2016/07/06/opinions/baton-rouge-blue-lives-matter-law-arjun-sethi/ [https://perma.cc 
/B6CF-E2LF]. 
 88. DENV. POST, supra note 77. 
 89. See Sethi, supra note 87 (arguing that unlike minority communities, 
police officers have always been supported by the law, which grants them 
immense power); see also Meyerson, supra note 67 (quoting civil rights attorney 
Jonathan Moore’s argument that police officers already “get so much benefit of 
the doubt from juries and legal immunity”). 
 90. See Perez-Pena, supra note 12. 
 91. Gellman & Lawrence, supra note 35, at 429. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 94. See generally Scott Steiner, Habitations of Cruelty: The Pitfalls of 
Expanding Hate Crime Legislation to Include the Homeless, 45 No. 5 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 836 (2009) (making a similar argument regarding efforts to expand state 
hate crime laws to protect homeless people). 
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source of protection.95 Its language creates burdens that make it an 
inefficient choice for prosecuting serious crimes against police but leaves 
open the possibility of use far beyond its contemplated purpose.96  
1. Police Officer Status Does Not Fit into a Hate Crime Statute 
Opponents of hate crime laws often criticize the laws’ perceived 
unfairness.97 The laws are plagued by the notion that they favor certain 
groups of people by granting them special protections.98 The idea of 
special protection generally is used to oppose the existence of the laws.99 
Representative Harris, however, actually relied on that idea in proposing 
the Blue Lives Matter law. He explained that because Louisiana’s hate 
crime statute already covered many other groups, it was appropriate to add 
police and first responders.100 His words suggest that the expansion was 
intended to equitably grant police officers the special protections that the 
hate crime law offered to other groups.101 
Representative Harris’s proposal demonstrates a fundamental 
misconception about the purpose of hate crime laws. The laws do not seek 
to single out certain groups of people for protection—instead they aim to 
protect all people from attacks motivated by prejudice toward enumerated 
characteristics.102 The laws achieve equal applicability by including only 
neutral characteristics inherent in all people: for example, a hate crime law 
does not explicitly provide harsher penalties for an offender who assaults 
a homosexual but rather for any offender who assaults any victim on the 
basis of sexual orientation.103 To say that such a law protects homosexuals 
may be a description of the law’s effect, but it is not an accurate description 
of how the law is written.104 Until the Blue Lives Matter law, Louisiana’s 
hate crime statute did not offer greater protection to any one group. 
                                                                                                             
 95. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 898. 
 97. Steiner, supra note 94, at 836. 
 98. Id. at 837. 
 99. Id. at 829 (explaining that California’s efforts to expand its hate crime law 
was met with the argument that “the legislature should not hand-pick a few victims”).  
 100. Greg Hilburn, ‘Blue Lives Matter’ Bill Expected to Become Law in 
Louisiana, USA TODAY (May 24, 2016, 7:11 AM), http://www.usatoday.com 
/story/news/nation-now/2016/05/23/blue-lives-matter-bill/84821440/ [https://per 
ma.cc/48R2-2FCE].  
 101. Id. 
 102. Steiner, supra note 94, at 837. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 812. 
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Police officer status, however, is not universally applicable but singles 
out a specific subset of the population. By adding this trait to the hate crime 
statute, legislators have elevated one specific class of victims above the 
others.105 They have inadvertently validated the previously inaccurate 
criticism that hate crime laws fundamentally are unfair.106  
Opponents of hate crime laws often expand upon the notion of the 
laws’ unfairness to question their constitutionality, alleging that the 
statutes grant special legal protections to certain groups and deny them to 
others in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal 
protection of the laws.107 Several state supreme courts have relied on the 
neutrality of the laws to reject this argument and uphold their 
constitutionality.108 For example, in State v. Ladue, the Vermont Supreme 
Court dismissed the argument that Vermont’s hate crime statute favors classes 
of persons based on race, sex, orientation, and other characteristics.109 The 
court explained that the statute does not treat similarly situated victims 
differently but protects all victims from crimes motivated by hate, “whether 
this hate is directed at minority or majority members of a class.”110 
Similarly, in State v. Talley, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Washington’s hate crime statute because its facial 
neutrality made it applicable to any defendant who targeted any victim on 
the basis of any of the listed characteristics.111  
These decisions suggest that hate crime laws draw their legitimacy 
from their neutrality.112 Laws that are universally applicable avoid running 
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause by providing the benefit of protection 
from prejudice to all citizens rather than favoring a single class of 
persons.113 By including police officer status, the Legislature has created 
a law that grants special protection to one group while excluding other 
                                                                                                             
 105. See id. (explaining that until the proposed addition of homelessness as a 
protected characteristic, not a single special group was created by hate crime laws 
in the United States). 
 106. See id. (arguing that expansion of a hate crime law to cover homelessness 
gives traction to criticism). 
 107. Id. at 836; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 108. See Steiner, supra note 94, at 812.  
 109. State v. Ladue, 631 A.2d 236 (Vt. 1993). 
 110. Id. at 237.  
 111. State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217, 22930 (Wash. 1993). 
 112. Steiner, supra note 94, at 820 (arguing that the neutrality of hate crime 
laws “is the root of their legitimacy”). 
 113. Id. 
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groups that may be similarly victimized because of their occupations.114 A 
challenge to the law under the Fourteenth Amendment is no longer without 
merit. The Blue Lives Matter law thus threatens the legitimacy of 
Louisiana’s hate crime statute by exposing it to constitutional attacks that 
most likely would have failed before the amendment.115  
Furthermore, adding a non-neutral characteristic may lead to over-
expansion of the statute. Hate crime laws are undergoing a trend of 
expansion.116 Although all existing state statutes include race, ethnicity, 
and religion, increasing advocacy efforts by special interest groups have 
led some states to include additional characteristics like age, political 
affiliation, and personal appearance.117 By lobbying for inclusion of 
certain traits, the special interest groups have created contentious politics 
about which characteristics should be covered, leading other advocacy 
groups to compete for comparative symbolic status for their own group.118  
Adding a non-neutral characteristic that specifically references a 
single group of people invites other advocacy groups to demand the same 
treatment.119 Legislators will be left with the choice of denying some of 
these requests while granting others, creating a “slippery slope of legal 
favoritism,”120 or avoiding the conflict by unilaterally accepting all 
requests. The first option unnecessarily brings contentious politics into the 
criminal law.121 The second threatens the utility of the laws. Expansion 
creates the misconception that violent acts are treated seriously only when 
they are designated as hate crimes and suggests that inclusion in the list of 
categories is a symbol of respect.122 This flawed understanding of the 
purpose of hate crime laws perpetuates the cycle of over-expansion.123 
The existence of hate crime laws is justified by the principle that 
perpetrators who commit crimes motivated by certain kinds of bias are 
                                                                                                             
 114. See Sethi, supra note 87 (explaining that if police officers are added, there 
is no reason not to add lawyers, doctors, or public servants). 
 115. Steiner, supra note 94, at 837. (“Only if the law protected only 
homosexuals, blacks and other minorities, or Jews and Wiccans for example, 
would the equal protection argument have any merit.”). 
 116. Meli, supra note 38, at 927. 
 117. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 867. 
 118. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 21. 
 119. Steiner, supra note 94, at 845.  
 120. Id. at 846.  
 121. Beale, supra note 41, at 1269 (noting that symbolic or expressive criminal 
legislation presents the special danger of undermining the efficiency of the 
criminal law). 
 122. See L.A. TIMES, supra note 18. 
 123. Id. (explaining that recent expansion of hate crime laws “creates the 
temptation to expand the coverage further to encompass ‘our’ group”).  
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more culpable than perpetrators who commit the same crimes for non-
biased reasons.124 If the list of covered “biases” continues to expand, 
virtually any crime in which the offender specifically chooses his victim 
on any basis could be punishable as a bias crime. Laws aimed at targeting 
a specific kind of crime rooted in prejudice would become general penalty 
enhancers, eliminating their meaning entirely.125 
2. The Blue Lives Matter Law Will Not Be Used Effectively  
Even if the hate crime statute was the proper vehicle to bolster police 
protection, it would not be effective. The Blue Lives Matter law carries 
burdens and risks that make it an inefficient tool for prosecuting the 
majority of crimes against police. Prosecutors likely will avoid the 
complications of the Blue Lives Matter law and rely instead on previously 
existing criminal statutes.126 In some cases, the Blue Lives Matter law may 
be used disproportionally against protesters, thereby discouraging citizens 
from speaking out against perceived injustices.127 Because an expressive 
law’s communicative impact is dependent upon how the law is enforced, 
either result will have negative consequences on the public and on hate 
crime law as a whole.128 
a. Potential Underuse 
Prosecutorial charging decisions generally are motivated by the desire 
to process cases efficiently and promote fairness and justice.129 A 
prosecutor’s desire to seek justice for a hate crime victim often conflicts 
with the desire to prosecute efficiently and effectively.130 When the 
difficulty of meeting the burden imposed by hate crime charges outweighs 
the possible benefit of doing so, prosecutors have little incentive to use 
hate crime laws.131 
                                                                                                             
 124. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 133; see also Ginsburg, supra note 
35, at 1631 (arguing that a crime committed for a practical reason does not 
“generate the same level of revulsion as a crime committed out of” hateful bias). 
 125. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 133 (arguing that exclusion of 
certain traits gives the laws meaning). 
 126. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 127. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b. 
 128. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 858. 
 129. Id. at 886. 
 130. Id. at 887. 
 131. Id. 
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The burden is proving that the offender selected the victim because of 
the victim’s employment as a law enforcement officer.132 In the majority 
of crimes against police, motives are not obvious or singular.133 
Prosecutors who pursue hate crime charges are left to separate the 
discriminatory motive from other, often comingling motives134 and prove 
the discriminatory motive exists, an extremely difficult task absent a rare 
self-incriminating statement from the offender.135 Additionally, hate crime 
charges carry the risk of complicating jury selection136 by relying on laws 
affiliated with divisive political and social issues.137 Prosecutors often fear 
that hate crime charges will make certain jurors more hesitant to convict 
or, conversely, more hostile toward defendants accused of certain 
biases.138 Charges under the controversial139 Blue Lives Matter law 
implicate a debate that has become increasingly partisan, often sharply 
                                                                                                             
 132. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:107.2 (2018). 
 133. Max Kutner, Who Kills Police Officers?, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 21, 2015, 11:50 
AM), http://www.newsweek.com/who-kills-police-officers-315701 (explaining that 
most often, police killings occur impulsively when officers attempt to arrest a suspect 
for a separate offense) [https://perma.cc/AGZ2-9943]. 
 134. Catherine Pugh, What Do You Get When You Add Megan Williams to 
Matthew Shepard and Victim Offender Mediation? A Hate Crime Law That 
Prosecutors Will Actually Want to Use, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 179, 194 (2008) 
(explaining that crimes generally have multiple motives, which contributes to 
complexity); Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 892 (arguing that hate crime cases are 
difficult if there is any other motive). 
 135. Pugh, supra note 134, at 191 (“[S]elf-incrimination is such a critical 
source of motive evidence that prosecutors generally avoid a hate crime charge in 
its absence.”). But see Eversley et al., supra note 1 (exemplifying the rare case in 
which the offender supplies his own motive with a self-incriminating statement).  
 136. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 89394. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 89394, 908 (“[I]t may not matter whether juries are actually capable 
of maintaining objectivity in practice; so long as prosecutors continue to believe that 
hate crime charges will have adverse effects on the jury pool, this belief alone may 
be enough to make it unlikely that prosecutors will include the charges . . . .”). 
 139. See, e.g., Hilburn, supra note 100 (quoting Ejike Obineme of the New 
Orleans chapter of the Black Youth Project 100, “Including ‘police’ as a protected 
class in hate crime legislation would serve to provide more protection to an 
institution that is statistically proven to be racist in action, policy and impact.”). But 
see, e.g., Kevin Conlon, Louisiana Governor Signs ‘Blue Lives Matter’ Bill, CNN 
(May 27, 2016, 11:22 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/26/us/louisiana-blue-
lives-matter-law/ (quoting Louisiana police superintendent expressing support for 
the bill) [https://perma.cc/Q36Z-CSEE]. 
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divided along racial and political lines.140 A prosecutor that brings charges 
under the law risks dividing his jury and jeopardizing his chance of a 
conviction.141 
In relation to the significant burden imposed by hate crime charges, 
the benefit is minimal. Most crimes against police already carry harsh 
penalties that would be only incrementally increased by hate crime 
charges.142 It is unlikely that many prosecutors would willingly take on the 
burden of proving motive and the risk of dividing their juries to pursue 
hate crime charges that ultimately would have little impact on the 
offender’s sentence.143 Instead, the law is likely to be underused by 
prosecutors who will choose to rely on previously existing criminal 
statutes.144 It may seem that underuse of the Blue Lives Matter law renders 
it ineffective but causes no real harm, but underuse will actually have 
grave effects on the expressive message of the law.145 
The more prominent the expressive element of a law is, the more 
significant it is to the public when the law is not used, despite seemingly 
                                                                                                             
 140. Dan Balz & Scott Clement, On Racial Issues, America is Divided Both 
Black and White and Red and Blue, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2014), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-racial-issues-america-is-divided-both-black-and-
white-and-red-and-blue/2014/12/26/3d2964c8-8d12-11e4-a085-34e9b9f09a58  
_story.html (noting that African-American and Causasian Americans have vastly 
different perceptions of the police’s role in society, and within the Causasian 
community, the division is shaped by partisan identification and ideology) 
[https://perma.cc/6NSW-CEHL].  
 141. Pugh, supra note 134, at 194 (suggesting that prosecutors are mindful of 
dividing their juries with hate crime charges). 
 142. For example, an offender who fatally shot a police officer could be 
charged with first-degree murder. To succeed on this charge, the prosecutor would 
have to prove that the offender killed the police officer with specific intent to kill 
or inflict great bodily harm on a police officer engaged in the performance of his 
lawful duties. See LA. REV. STAT. § 14:30(2) (2018). A hate crime charge could 
increase the penalty by a maximum of only five years. Id. § 14:107.2. This increase 
essentially would be meaningless when added to a sentence of death or life 
imprisonment. See § 14:30(2) (providing that first-degree murder carries a 
sentence of life imprisonment or death). 
 143. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 887–89 (explaining that when an added hate 
crime charge increases the penalty only incrementally, or when prosecutors feel 
that an offender’s sentence is sufficient without a hate crime enhancement, they 
may not consider it worthwhile to expend additional resources pursuing hate 
crime convictions). 
 144. Id. at 890. 
 145. Id. at 904. 
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fitting the facts of a case.146 The expressive Blue Lives Matter law147 
responded to several highly publicized violent attacks characterized by 
clear anti-police motives.148 By enacting the law, the Legislature sought to 
demonstrate that anti-police crimes are similar to crimes motivated by 
racial or religious prejudice in that they are particularly abhorrent and 
warrant the most severe punishment.149 Enactment alone, however, is not 
enough to serve an expressive law’s purpose.150 For a law to convey its 
intended message fully, it must be enforced.151  
Failure to enforce the law not only dilutes its intended message but 
may directly contradict it.152 A prosecutor’s decision to avoid hate crime 
charges in a case with seemingly prejudicial elements often results in 
public outrage.153 The public, particularly members of the group who share 
the protected characteristic with the victim, question the purpose of the 
                                                                                                             
 146. Id.; see also Pugh, supra note 134, at 196 (“In many cases, the victim and 
his or her class feel underserved when a prosecutor bypasses a hate charge in lieu 
of a more traditional offense.”). 
 147. See, e.g., John Newsome & Carma Hassan, ‘Blue Lives Matter’ Bill Set 
for Louisiana Governor’s Signature, CNN (May 20, 2016), http://www.cnn.com 
/2016/05/20/us/louisiana-blue-lives-matter-legislation/ (quoting a Blue Lives 
Matter spokesman’s suggestion that the law “is important because symbolically it 
advises that there is value to the lives of police officers”) [https://perma.cc/3V9G-
U2TF]. 
 148. Crisp, supra note 9. 
 149. See Newsome & Hassan, supra note 147 (quoting Representative Harris’s 
explanation that because crimes targeting police are “like a hate crime,” the crimes 
need to be covered by Louisiana’s “extensive hate crime statute”). 
 150. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 864 (“[W]hen enacting expressive 
legislation, legislators should consider carefully what messages they may be 
sending both ex ante to potential victims and defendants upon passage of laws and 
ex post based on predictions of how prosecutors will use these laws in practice.”). 
 151. Id. at 899. 
 152. Id.; see also Beale, supra note 41, at 1267 (questioning how those persons 
to whom the message is addressed would react if they knew the statute would be 
enforced seldomly). 
 153. See, e.g., Ned Parker & Mimi Dwyer, Attacks Against LGBT Community 
Rarely Prosecuted as Hate Crimes, REUTERS (June 28, 2016, 4:21 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/florida-shooting-hate-crimes/ 
(criticizing decision not to charge killer of Dionte Greene, a gay man, with a hate 
crime) [https://perma.cc/KQG2-P8SC]; Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, Victim’s 
Son: ‘They Ran Him Over Because He Was Black’, CNN (Jan. 17, 2013, 3:25 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/17/us/mississippi-hit-and-run/index.html (questioning 
the lack of hate crime charges in hit and run of a black man in Mississippi) 
[https://perma.cc/U3WH-788M].  
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law and the sincerity of those who enacted it.154 Each time a prosecutor 
fails to bring charges under the Blue Lives Matter law when it seems to 
apply, proponents of the law are left wondering whether the government 
ever truly intended to protect police from bias-motivated attacks.155 
Ultimately, an unenforced law may send the message to both law 
enforcement and the public that anti-police crimes are not as serious or 
prevalent as legislators suggested upon enactment.156 The value of an 
expressive hate crime law comes from its message, and a message that is 
undercut or contradicted by the law’s application renders the law 
ineffective and potentially harmful.157 
b. Potential Misuse 
Opponents of the Blue Lives Matter law are concerned that the law 
will be used to punish citizens who protest police activity.158 The Blue 
Lives Matter law is an impractical tool to prosecute most crimes against 
police,159 but it has the potential to be used in situations in which the 
prosecutorial burden of proving motive is easier to meet and the relative 
impact on the offender’s sentence is more significant.160 Criminal offenses 
stemming from protests fall into this category of offenses. For example, a 
protester who demonstrates at a police station161 can be charged with 
                                                                                                             
 154. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 138 (noting that when hate crime 
charges are not applied, “[S]ome journalists, advocacy organizations, politicians, 
and individuals charge the police and rival commentators, with hypocrisy, bias, 
double standards, and pandering to one group or another.”). 
 155. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 904. 
 156. Id. at 899–900.  
 157. Id.  
 158. See, e.g., Sethi, supra note 87 (“Black Lives Matter activists may find 
themselves on the receiving end of a particularly perverse application of the new 
Louisiana law. A protester who raises his elbows when confronted by a cop could 
be charged with a hate crime and assault.”); Marshaun D. Simon, ‘Blue Lives 
Matter’: Louisiana Hate Crimes Bill to Protect First Responders, NBC NEWS 
(May 23, 2016, 10:03 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/blue-lives-
matter-louisiana-hate-crimes-bill-protect-first-responders-n576246 (quoting a 
Louisiana public defender predicting that the law could have negative 
repercussions for protesters) [https://perma.cc/B46Q-JRTC]. 
 159. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a (explaining that the burden of proving 
anti-police motive often outweighs the minimal effect that successful hate crime 
charges have on penalties that are already severe). 
 160. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 887. 
 161. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rosner & Daniel Prendergast, 10 Protesters Arrested 
Outside Police Station, N.Y. POST (July 21, 2016, 2:54 PM), http://nypost.com 
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criminal trespass,162 an offense that carries relatively light penalties: a fine 
between $100 and $500, imprisonment for a maximum of 30 days, or 
both.163 A hate crime charge could increase the penalties significantly, 
adding fines of up to $500 and jail time of up to six months.164 The 
potential impact on penalties makes pursuing hate crime charges more 
beneficial to the prosecutor, and his burden of proving motive is much less 
challenging in these instances. The protesters’ chants165 could support an 
allegation of anti-police motive—in many cases, the defendant’s use of 
racial epithets or slogans before, during, or after the crime has served as 
circumstantial evidence of bias motive.166  
Like underuse, misuse of the statute against protesters would have a 
detrimental impact on the message of the law. Critics of the Blue Lives 
Matter law have alleged that the true motive of the law is not to protect 
police from violence but to unilaterally reject calls for police reform and 
accountability.167 Use of the statute to punish protesters would validate 
                                                                                                             
/2016/07/21/10-protesters-arrested-outside-police-station/ [https://perma.cc/GZ59-
XMKZ]. 
 162. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:63 (2018) (defining “criminal trespass” as entering a 
structure or movable owned by another without express, legal, or implied authorization). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. § 14:107.2 (naming criminal trespass as an underlying offense 
triggering hate crime charges); see also Simon, supra note 158 (“Any protest in a 
police station could be criminal trespass, but now it could also be a hate crime.”). 
 165. ‘Pigs in a Blanket’ Chant at Minnesota Fair Riles Police, CBS (Aug. 31, 
2015, 6:03 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pigs-in-a-blanket-chant-at-min 
nesota-fair-riles-police/ (describing protesters chanting “pigs in a blanket, fry ‘em 
like bacon”) [https://perma.cc/6AVV-P6LA]; Paighten Harkins, Tulsa Black Lives 
Matter Marchers Call for Justice, Peace, ‘No Racist Police’, TULSA WORLD (July 
13, 2016), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/local/tulsa-black-lives-matter-marchers-
call-for-justice-peace-no/article_1e3ae192-e3a9-5cd8-aa90-1d56c4ca8ced.html  
(describing protest chants of “[n]o justice, no peace, no racist police” and “they say 
get back, we say fight back”) [https://perma.cc/595P-E62W]. 
 166. ZACHARY WOLFE, HATE CRIMES LAW § 11:14 (June 2016). See, e.g., State v. 
Hendrix, 838 P.2d 566 (Or. 1992) (defendant’s accomplice’s use of racial slurs and 
racist slogans supported the conviction of ethnic intimidation); Grimm v. Churchill, 
932 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff’s use of racial slurs supported defendant police 
officer’s arresting him for violating Illinois’s ethnic intimidation statute). 
 167. See, e.g., Sethi, supra note 87 (“Making police officers a protected class 
is just the latest effort to avoid police accountability.”); see also Kami N. Chavis, 
Hate Crime Laws to Protect Police Are Misguided, JURIST (July 13, 2016, 9:19 
AM), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2016/07/kami-chavis-hate-crime.php (“[T]he 
Louisiana law . . . do[es] not appear to be based on legitimate goals to protect 
police, but many critics see them as thinly veiled backlashes to recent calls for 
police reform.”) [https://perma.cc/56BR-MY3M]. 
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these allegations and further deteriorate the relationship between police 
officers and communities.168 Such use would also be a direct contradiction 
to the understood purpose of hate crime laws. The laws promote justice 
and equality by serving as “societal condemnation[s] of racism, religious 
intolerance, and other forms of bigotry.”169 That Louisiana’s hate crime 
statute can now be used to penalize a person protesting perceived bigotry 
and inequality in the criminal justice system is counterintuitive. It sends a 
message to the public that by alleging the kind of prejudice that the statute 
intends to prevent, a person commits a punishable act of prejudice.170 It 
also works to dissuade citizens from exercising their constitutionally 
protected right to protest, thus discouraging active participation in the 
political realm.171 
A New Jersey legislator proposing a Blue Lives Matter bill in his own 
state suggested that his bill would be the proper measure to “address the 
polarization in this country.”172 Louisiana has demonstrated that enacting 
a Blue Lives Matter law does little to address polarization,173 and practical 
application of the law is likely to intensify it. Underuse suggests that 
legislators had no sincere intentions to protect law enforcement officers 
from bias-motivated attacks and frustrates proponents and advocacy 
groups who believe that law enforcement is entitled to the full benefit of 
                                                                                                             
 168. Chavis, supra note 167. 
 169. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 167. 
 170. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 899 (arguing that application of hate crime 
charges to non-archetypal hate crimes dilutes the message of combating intergroup 
hatred); see also Yanan Wang, Should Attacking Police Officers Become a Hate 
Crime? A Minnesota City Says Yes, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.washing 
tonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/10/08/should-attacking-police-officers-be  
come-a-hate-crime-a-minnesota-city-says-yes/ (“Making [police] the first profession 
to receive a penalty enhancement under hate crimes legislation would ‘paradoxically, 
give legal protection to a group that is notorious for perpetrating violence against the 
very people that hate crime laws were originally intended to protect.’”) [https://per 
ma.cc/B5Y2-9M4S]. 
 171. Elahe Izadi, Louisiana Is the First State to Offer Hate Crime Protections 
to Police Officers, WASH. POST (May 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/05/26/louisianas-blue-lives-matter-bill-just-be  
came-law/?utm_term=.3c66a379ae67 [https://perma.cc/HB79-7P2G]. 
 172. Rebecca Beitsch, Is Killing a Police Officer a Hate Crime?, PBS NEWS 
(Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/killing-police-officer-hate-
crime/ (quoting New Jersey assemblyman Ronald Dancer) [https://perma.cc/YE 
7M-XZQZ].  
 173. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (demonstrating the controversy 
of the law). 
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the legislation.174 Misuse propagates the incorrect idea that the law’s stated 
purpose of police protection actually refers to protecting police from 
criticism and accountability.175 Either application breeds resentment and 
increases conflict between social groups.176 The Legislature can avoid 
these consequences either by repealing the law or extensively modifying 
it.  
III. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
Police officers serve a vital purpose in democratic society by enforcing 
and upholding the law. The state has a special interest in protecting 
“[those] public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order to 
guard the safety of other persons and property.”177 It is wrong, however, 
to distort Louisiana’s hate crime statute to serve a purpose that is better 
accomplished through other means.178 The Blue Lives Matter law should 
be repealed or, at the very least, revised. 
A. Revising the Law: An Imperfect Solution 
Proponents of the law may seek to address its problems through 
revision. An adequate revision requires several changes—each of which 
presents new problems for the statute. First, legislators must replace 
“status as a law enforcement officer” with a generalized characteristic, 
such as occupation. Because occupation is a neutral human characteristic, 
the addition would properly protect all people from crimes motivated by 
occupation-based bias rather than creating a special group.179 Although 
this modification is necessary to a valid revision, it is flawed in its 
redundancy. Louisiana’s hate crime statute has always included “actual or 
perceived membership or service in, or employment with, an 
                                                                                                             
 174. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 899. 
 175. Kelly Riddell, Black Lives Matter and Blue Lives Matter at Odds, WASH. 
TIMES (July 29, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jul/29/black 
-lives-matter-and-blue-lives-matter-at-odds/ (discussing difficulty of supporting 
both Black Lives Matter protests and Blue Lives Matter legislation in modern 
debate over policing) [https://perma.cc/HC9K-RFU2]. 
 176. Chavis, supra note 167. 
 177. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 (1977). 
 178. Steiner, supra note 94, at 843 (“It is wrong, however, to hijack an 
effective and intellectually honest legal tool and appropriate it to one’s own 
interest group.”). 
 179. See id. at 812.  
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organization.”180 “Organization” is defined broadly,181 covering nearly any 
conceivable occupation, including police officers.182 A generalized 
occupation characteristic that simply restates the pre-existing law adds no 
protection and serves no purpose that could not be equally served by 
repealing the Blue Lives Matter law entirely.183 
Furthermore, even a neutral characteristic like occupation does not 
necessarily belong in a hate crime statute. To properly combat crimes 
committed against people because of fundamental features of their 
identity,184 the laws should include only identity traits, which are those 
traits that yield identifiable groups with some shared self-consciousness or 
collective identity.185 Not all identity traits have a place in hate crime laws, 
however.186 Scholars suggest adding only those identity traits that 
implicate societal fissure lines, or “divisions that run deep in the social 
history of a culture.”187 The societal fissure line analysis is based on the 
principle that hate crime statutes are not meant to target personal prejudice; 
rather, they should target prejudice with a social context that is 
recognizable in society.188  
                                                                                                             
 180. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:107.2 (2018). 
 181. § 14:107.2(D) (defining organization as “[a]ny lawful corporation, trust, 
company, partnership, association, foundation, or fund”; “[a]ny lawful group of 
persons, whether or not incorporated, banded together for joint action on any subject 
or subjects”; or “[a]ny entity or unit of federal, state, or local government”). 
 182. See § 14:107.2; see also Perez-Pena, supra note 12 (quoting Representative 
Harris, who explained that the Blue Lives Matter bill simply made explicit what was 
already implied by the statute). 
 183. See Perez-Pena, supra note 12. 
 184. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 185. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 12; see also Jorn, supra note 49, at 324 
(explaining that an assortment of people constitutes a group when some portion of 
a society views it as “an identifiable group of persons who, to some degree, maintain 
a collective identity,” or “common interests, experiences, and solidarity”). 
 186. See LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 12 (explaining that the list of traits that 
could qualify as identity characteristics is over-inclusive and should be narrowed 
down through further analysis). 
 187. Id. at 1112; see also L.A. TIMES, supra note 18 (arguing that a hate 
crime, as distinguished from an ordinary crime, “is rooted in a pervasive and 
especially pernicious prejudice that infects society at large.”). 
 188. Id. Lawrence distinguishes between these two types of prejudice with two 
hypothetical examples. In the first scenario, Person A decides before meeting 
Person B that he dislikes B because B is Jewish, and A believes that Jewish people 
are inherently dishonest. In the second scenario, Person C decides before meeting 
Person D that he dislikes D because D has blue eyes, and C believes that people 
with blue eyes are untrustworthy. C’s prejudice is not group antipathy with a social 
context. There may be other individuals that share C’s perception of blue-eyed 
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Occupation may constitute an identity trait,189 but it does not implicate 
a societal fissure line comparable to race or religion.190 Additionally, a 
relatively recent series of high-profile murders of police officers does not 
create a societal fissure.191 The idea that society is embroiled in a “war on 
cops” originated in 2014 because of “low-frequency, high impact events” 
like the ambush style murders of Officers Ramos and Liu.192 It remains 
unsupported by convincing evidence. A study conducted by the FBI found 
that 51 officers were killed in the line of duty in 2014,193 a significant 
increase from the 27 officers killed in 2013.194 The increase is less 
alarming, however, when considered in context. The 2013 number was a 
                                                                                                             
people, but there is no cultural history of eye color discrimination and no underlying 
ideology or worldview connecting those who discriminate on that basis. Id.; see also 
JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 146 (suggesting that hate crime laws target 
antipathy with a social context by requiring a showing that the offender’s conduct 
was linked to furthering the ideals and goals of a recognized hate group). 
 189. Much of the dispute over the Blue Lives Matter law has centered around 
whether a characteristic like profession actually is an identity trait appropriate for 
inclusion in a hate crime law. See, e.g., DENV. POST, supra note 77 (“[B]eing a 
police officer is not an innate part of a person’s identity. You’re not born a police 
officer.”); see also, e.g., Conlon, supra note 139 (quoting Allison Padilla-
Goodman, regional director of the Anti-Defamation League, arguing that “working 
in a profession” is not the kind of “personal characteristic” to be included in hate 
crime laws) [https://perma.cc/U996-DNXN]. 
 190. See LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 13 (suggesting that determining where 
societal fissure lines fall requires beginning with classic examples like race or 
religion and looking for commonalities between the experiences of those groups and 
the experiences of the proposed group); see also Gellman & Lawrence, supra note 
35, at 429 (suggesting that determining which characteristics should be covered by 
hate crime laws is contextual and requires social evaluation of societal fissure lines). 
 191. See Steiner, supra note 94, at 15 (arguing that several highly publicized 
murders of homeless people do not justify including homelessness in the hate 
crime statute). 
 192. See supra Introduction; see also Perez-Pena, supra note 12 (arguing that 
low-frequency, high-impact events drive perception). 
 193. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 76 (showing that 41 officers 
were killed in 2015 in comparison to 51 in 2014).  
 194. See FBI Releases 2012 Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 
Assaulted, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 28, 2013), https://archives.fbi.gov 
/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2012-statistics-on-law-enforce  
ment-officers-killed-and-assaulted (showing that 27 officers were killed in the line 
of duty in 2013, a decrease from 48 in 2012) [https://perma.cc/YEB7-LJKV].  
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historic low.195 The 2014 figure was only slightly higher than 2012,196 and 
it was followed by a 20% decrease in 2015.197 2016 numbers reveal 
another increase.198 Sixty-six officers were killed in the line of duty, 199 a 
number bolstered200 by police officer shootings with multiple fatalities in 
Dallas201 and Baton Rouge.202 These numbers, however, do not presently 
signify a developing trend but instead an unfortunate anomaly.203 The 
                                                                                                             
 195. Id.; see also Radley Balko, Once Again, There Is No War on Cops, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015 
/09/10/once-again-there-is-no-war-on-cops-and-those-who-claim-otherwise-are-play 
ing-a-dangerous-game/?utm_term=.5ae162841516 [https://perma.cc/S79R-K5RH].  
 196. See supra notes 76, 194. 
 197. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 76 (“Preliminary 
statistics released today by the FBI show that 41 law enforcement officers were 
feloniously killed in the line of duty in 2015. This is a decrease of almost 20 
percent when compared with the 51 officers killed in 2014.”).  
 198. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI Releases 2016 Statistics for Law 
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted in the Line of Duty (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2016-statistics-for 
-law-enforcement-officers-killed-and-assaulted-in-the-line-of-duty [https://perma 
.cc/K7Y4-SCUQ].  
 199. Id. 
 200. Jason Hanna & Steve Visser, Fallen Officers: 38 Shot Dead in the Line 
of Duty in 2016, CNN (Aug. 26, 2016, 3:14 PM) (citing Preliminary 2016 Law 
Enforcement Officer Fatalities, NAT’L LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEMORIAL 
FUND, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/officer-fatalities-data/ (last visited Oct. 10, 
2016)) [https://perma.cc/6JKM-KMV4], http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/14 
/us/police-officers-fatal-shooting-line-duty-nationwide/ (explaining that 41 officers 
were murdered between January 1 and September 19, 2016 in comparison to 28 
during the same period of 2015) [https://perma.cc/X8RC-E7FS]. 
 201. In July 2016, a sniper opened fire on Dallas police officers during a police 
brutality protest, killing five officers and wounding seven more. See Manny 
Fernandez, Richard Perez-Pena & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Five Dallas Officers 
Were Killed as Payback, Police Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/us/dallas-police-shooting.html [https://perma 
.cc/5CY7-FRDD].  
 202. In July 2016, a gunman in Baton Rouge fired at officers responding to an 
emergency call, leaving three dead and three others wounded. See Amy Ellis Nutt, 
Matt Zapotosky & Mark Berman, 3 Police Officers Killed, 3 Wounded in Baton 
Rouge; Gunman Dead, WASH. POST (July 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/politics/3-police-officers-killed-3-wounded-in-baton-rouge/2016/07/17/373  
4a3a6-4c2f-11e6-aa14-e0c1087f7583_story.html [https://perma.cc/T9AZ-44XE]. 
 203. Max Lewontin, Are Police Deaths Really on the Rise? It Depends on How 
You Look at It, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 28, 2016), http://www.csmon 
itor.com/USA/Justice/2016/0728/Are-police-deaths-really-on-the-rise-It-depends- 
on-how-you-look-at-it [https://perma.cc/W9TS-BFQM].  
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number of officer fatalities in 2016 still fell below the average of the 
previous ten years.204 To classify the relatively recent wave of conflict as 
a societal fissure line worthy of legislative intervention is premature.205 
Although it may seem that early intervention is preferable to inaction, 
premature legislation is not without consequence; it signifies acceptance 
of the “war on cops” narrative and ultimately strengthens the media’s 
portrayal of an ever-widening divide between citizens and police.206 
Enactment of the law therefore inadvertently intensifies social divisions 
and may contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy.207 Legislators can avoid 
these social consequences by exercising restraint and extending hate crime 
coverage only to those identity traits that clearly implicate societal fissure 
lines.208  
The societal fissure line limitation will also help legislators avoid 
furthering the current trend of over-expansion that threatens the utility of 
hate crime laws.209 Other states have chosen not to use such limitations and 
                                                                                                             
 204. Camila Domonoske, Number of Police Officers Killed by Firearms Rose 
in 2016, Study Finds, NPR (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/12/30/507536360/number-of-police-officers-killed-by-firearms-rose-
in-2016-study-finds [https://perma.cc/WHK2-BDNF].  
 205. See Wang, supra note 170 (comparing the short-term history of crimes 
against police to the history of hate crimes against minorities and suggesting that 
the ambush murders of police officers are too recent to be considered anything 
other than a short-term trend); see also Kate Wheeling, Are Attacks on Police 
Hate Crimes?, PAC. STANDARD (May 25, 2016), https://psmag.com/are-attacks-
on-police-hate-crimes-7b9db6fabdee#.2pogcit2r (“[D]espite the ire toward police 
in America today, the persecution of police is hardly on par with the persecution 
that other protected groups have faced.”) [https://perma.cc/VV5V -Q4ZN]; 
Derrick Clifton, Killing a Cop Is a Horrible Crime—But It’s Not a Hate Crime, 
CHI. READER (July 8, 2016, 5:46 PM), http://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader 
/archives/2016/07/08/killing-a-cop-is-a-horrible-crimebut-its-not-a-hate-crime  
(“There’s no comparison between generations of race-based dehumanization and 
the many ebbs and flows of public scrutiny or animosity towards police. There’s 
no parallel between the occupational hazards faced by police and the lived 
realities of protected groups experiencing targeted discrimination and violent 
crime based on their immutable identities.”) [https://perma.cc/5SSM-V7TG]. 
 206. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 64 (arguing that the uncritical 
acceptance of a hate crime epidemic may have negative sociopolitical ramifications). 
 207. Id.  
 208. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 908 (arguing that legislators should limit 
the addition of new protected categories). 
 209. Id.; see also discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing over-expansion of 
hate crime laws).  
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have added traits like homelessness210 or political affiliation211 to their 
respective hate crime statutes. If Louisiana chooses to follow this approach, 
however, there may be unfortunate consequences on the statute as a whole. 
The societal fissure line justification acts as a bar to over-expansion of hate 
crime statutes by giving legislators a logical method to determine which 
traits should be included.212 Without the societal fissure line analysis or a 
similarly restrictive method in place, it becomes especially difficult for them 
to deny any interest group’s demands to include their defining trait.213  
The resulting over-expansion would be particularly problematic for 
Louisiana’s statute. Its structure is broad enough to include ordinary crimes 
of opportunity.214 When a vast number of characteristics are included in a 
statute that also covers opportunistic crimes, the potential for “creative 
use”215 of the statute is significant.216 As Louisiana’s hate crime law 
expands to include even more crime victims, so does the potential to apply 
the law in ways that are permissible under the language of the statute but 
not aligned with the purpose of hate crime legislation.217 Therefore, if 
legislators choose to include traits like “occupation” that do not implicate 
societal fissure lines, further modification of the statute is necessary to 
limit the application of the statute. 
                                                                                                             
 210. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (2018) (providing “homeless status” as a 
protected characteristic). 
 211. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21 (2018) (providing “political affiliation” 
as a protected characteristic). 
 212. See LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 12–15; see also Eisenberg, supra note 
24, at 908 (suggesting limiting expansion of protected categories to those 
categories for which group-based animus is a particular concern). 
 213. Steiner, supra note 94, at 15. 
 214. See In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1377 (Cal. 1995) (ruling that a California 
statute, due to its “because of” discriminatory selection structure, contained 
nothing in its text that suggested the California Legislature intended to limit 
punishment to offenses committed exclusively or even mainly because of the 
prohibited bias). 
 215. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 898 (explaining how New York prosecutors 
recently have begun to use the hate crime statute, which includes age as a 
protected category and has no animus requirement, to prosecute cases involving 
swindling of elderly victims, though those crimes do not involve the “invidious 
hatred toward[s] particular groups” that the statute sought to address). 
 216. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1602; see also Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 908. 
 217. See discussion supra Part I.B; see also Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 163132 
(arguing that it is troubling that legislators might enact a statute to prohibit a species 
of conduct but use the broad language of the statute to harshly penalize a distinct 
species of conduct). 
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By redrafting the law to include an animus requirement,218 legislators can 
ensure that the law is used only in cases of invidious hatred.219 An animus 
requirement significantly raises the burden of proof by requiring prosecutors 
to prove specifically that the perpetrator was motivated by prejudice, bigotry, 
or bias based on the victim’s identity.220 By narrowing the definition of a hate 
crime, the addition of an animus requirement alleviates the risk of 
overcharging ordinary crimes of opportunity as hate crimes.221  
Unfortunately, this change, though necessary to counterbalance 
expansion, will have significant ramifications.222 Prosecutors often forego 
hate crime charges to avoid the challenges imposed by their steep burdens of 
proof.223 An amendment that demands even greater proof of subjective bias 
motivation likely will make use of the statute extremely rare.224 Infrequent use 
will hinder the expressive value of the hate crime statute,225 which is already 
significantly weakened by expansion.226 When the statute is used, convictions 
will be difficult to obtain, impairing the practical purpose of the law by 
keeping some victims of hate crimes from finding justice.227 
Revision of the Blue Lives Matter law is possible, but the complex 
revision process ultimately produces a statute that is less effective than the 
pre-Blue Lives Matter version in combatting hate crimes.228 A modified 
statute is certainly preferable to the current heavily flawed version, but the 
impact that a revision will have on the utility of the statute is a high price 
to pay for police protection—an objective that can be readily obtained 
                                                                                                             
 218. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 219. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 908 (“[L]egislators might choose to amend 
hate crime statutes by adding an animus requirement, thus eliminating the 
possibility that ordinary crimes of opportunity would be charged as hate crimes.”). 
 220. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 221. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 870; see also JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 
27, at 146. 
 222. See infra note 226 and accompanying text; see also infra note 230.  
 223. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 892; Pugh, supra note 134, at 191. 
 224. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 23 (arguing that narrowly drawn 
hate crime statutes, like those requiring animus, can only be used to prosecute the 
most obvious of hate crimes, which are rare). 
 225. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (explaining how the expressive impact 
of hate crime law is dependent on enforcement of the law). 
 226. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 909 (“The addition of too many categories . 
. . may dilute the communicative impact of hate crime legislation.”). 
 227. See discussion supra Part I.B (explaining the practical purpose of hate 
crime laws). 
 228. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 23; see also supra note 224 and 
accompanying text. 
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through other sources.229 Revision is a significantly less efficient and less 
practical solution than repeal.230 
B. Repealing the Law: Nothing Lost, Plenty Gained 
The issue of police protection is primarily one of safety, not hate.231 If 
the Blue Lives Matter law were to be repealed, police officers would 
remain well protected by previously existing criminal laws, which already 
offer heightened protection by severely penalizing many serious offenses 
against police, including murder,232 battery,233 and aggravated assault.234 
If legislators find that police safety is threatened by other offenses not yet 
covered, they can draft new provisions to specifically cover those offenses. 
This tactic was used by the Legislature in 1997, when disarming a peace 
officer was made a criminal offense punishable by up to five years’ 
imprisonment.235 The addition directly responded to the narrow category 
of offenses that would have previously been forced under broader assault 
and battery statutes.236 Initially, “disarming” referred only to taking 
possession of an officer’s firearm, but the law was later expanded to 
include taking possession of any law enforcement equipment.237 The 
statute demonstrates how new threats can be addressed effectively through 
new provisions, and those provisions can be modified as needed to cover 
broader ranges of conduct. 
                                                                                                             
 229. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 230. See generally JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 23 (explaining the 
practical consequences of the animus requirement); see also discussion infra Part 
III.B (describing how other criminal law provisions can be used to address crimes 
against police officers without requiring changes to the hate crime statute). 
 231. See L.A. TIMES, supra note 18. 
 232. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:30(2) (2018). 
 233. Id. § 14:34.2(B). 
 234. Id. § 14:37.2. 
 235. See id. § 14:34.6 (defining “disarming a peace officer” as “when an 
offender, through use of force or threat of force, and without the consent of the 
peace officer, takes possession of any law enforcement equipment from the person 
of a peace officer or from an area within the peace officer’s immediate control, 
when the offender has reasonable grounds to believe that the victim is a peace 
officer acting in the performance of his duty”). 
 236. Act No. 558, 1997 La. Acts 901. 
 237. See Act No. 820, 2010 La. Acts 2790; § 14:34.6 (defining “equipment” 
as including “any firearms, weapons, restraints, ballistics shields, forced entry 
tools, defense technology equipment, self-defense batons, self-defense sprays, 
chemical weapons, or electro shock weapons issued to a peace officer and used in 
the course and scope of his law enforcement duties”). 
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The Blue Lives Matter law may remain necessary to protect police 
officers from the specific class of crimes in which the offender is 
motivated by invidious hatred against police as a group. Studies suggest 
that when a prosecutor charges an offender with an ordinary offense 
instead of a hate crime, the victim and his group feel underserved because 
the ordinary charge emphasizes the conduct rather than the hateful 
motivation, which is the true source of the additional harm.238 In the case 
of police officers, however, the unique harm caused by anti-police 
motivation can be addressed through ordinary criminal law. 
For example, Louisiana law provides that an offender is guilty of first-
degree murder when he kills with the specific intent to kill or inflict great 
bodily harm upon a police officer performing his duties or “when the 
[offender’s] specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm is directly 
related to the victim’s status as a [police officer].”239 The first clause 
emphasizes the offender’s conduct and addresses the practical need to 
protect police officers performing a public service.240 The second clause 
specifically addresses situations when an offender is motivated to kill a 
police officer because of his status as such.241 By making anti-police 
motive an aggravating factor, the provision acknowledges the unique harm 
inherent in a crime motivated by animosity toward an entire group and 
penalizes accordingly.242 If the Blue Lives Matter law is repealed, 
legislators can draft similar provisions to apply to other underlying violent 
crimes.  
Legislators can also use ordinary criminal provisions to address 
conduct with elements typically characteristic of hate crimes. Hate crimes 
often are intended to intimidate the victim and cause terror within a 
community.243 The Legislature demonstrated its ability to respond directly 
                                                                                                             
 238. Pugh, supra note 134, at 196. 
 239. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:30(2). 
 240. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 (1977) (“[T]he fact that the 
murder victim was a peace officer performing his regular duties may be regarded 
as aggravating circumstance [because] [t]here is a special interest in affording 
protection to [those] public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order 
to guard the safety of other persons and property.”). 
 241. Act No. 1056, 2001 La. Acts 2222 (classifying an offense as first degree 
murder when the offender had specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm 
on a peace officer because of his status). 
 242. See Pugh, supra note 134, at 196. 
 243. Sethi, supra note 87; see also Gellman & Lawrence, supra note 35, at 441 
(proposing a model statute defining hate crimes as those crimes committed with 
a purpose to create terror in a definable community or with the knowledge that 
the crime would create a perception of threat against the definable community). 
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to crimes with these elements in 1999 by criminalizing the use of a laser244 
on a peace officer when the offender has “reasonable grounds to believe 
that the officer will . . . be injured, intimidated, or placed in fear of bodily 
harm.”245 The statute protects police officers from offenders seeking to 
threaten or intimidate them without the complication of requiring a 
showing of anti-police motive imposed by the hate crime statute.  
In addition to greater functionality, ordinary criminal provisions also 
have expressive value.246 Legislators can demonstrate support of law 
enforcement officers and condemnation of their attackers through the 
harsh penalties that accompany these provisions.247 Because the laws are 
easier to apply than the Blue Lives Matter law, their intended message will 
not be contradicted by underuse after enactment but will be strengthened 
through enforcement.248 
Ultimately, repealing the Blue Lives Matter law and relying on new 
and existing criminal provisions to prosecute crimes against police officers 
will not deprive police officers of either practical protection or expressive 
support. Society’s most cherished values are reflected in the criminal law 
by applying the harshest penalties to those crimes that violate these 
values.249 Louisiana’s criminal law simultaneously can reflect the values 
of protecting public servants and protecting citizens from crimes rooted in 
bigotry. By addressing these two purposes separately, legislators can avoid 
invoking the intergroup controversy that commonly accompanies hate 
crime expansion250 or undermining the efficacy of the existing hate crime 
law.251  
CONCLUSION 
In a lawful society, police officers represent order. The public execution 
of a police officer who is performing his duties signifies an attack on that 
                                                                                                             
 244. See LA. REV. STAT. § 14:37.3 (defining “laser” as “any device that projects a 
beam or point of light by means of light amplification by stimulated emission of 
radiation or any device that emits light which simulates the appearance of a laser”). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 858. 
 247. See Perez-Pena, supra note 12. 
 248. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 249. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 169. 
 250. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 133 (arguing that hate crime 
expansions inspire inter-group fighting over what should be covered, an exercise 
that “hardly contributes to a more tolerant and harmonious society”). 
 251. Beale, supra note 41, at 1269. 
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order.252 Although it may be tempting to legislators to respond to the chaos 
with reactionary legislation that symbolically demonstrates support for 
lawful order, such action is shortsighted. Legislators must think beyond 
enactment and consider the practical application of the law and the purpose 
it will serve. The Blue Lives Matter law rarely will be applied to the types 
of crimes that inspired its existence and, instead, may be applied in ways 
that are both unjust to citizens and contradictory to the purpose of hate crime 
laws.  
The law does not solve an existing problem but creates new ones by 
weakening Louisiana’s hate crime statute and contributing to the widening 
divide between citizens and police.253 Protecting police from violence is 
critically important, but the protection need not come at such an enormous 
societal cost. By repealing or heavily revising the Blue Lives Matter law, 
legislators simultaneously can protect police officers and preserve the 
validity of Louisiana’s hate crime statute. 
 
Savannah Walker 
                                                                                                             
 252. Eversley et al., supra note 1 (calling New York police shootings an attack 
on lawful society). 
 253. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b. 
  J.D./D.C.L., 2018. Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
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